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NOTES & COMMENTS
NATURAL GAS RATE REGULATION: THE
CONFLICT IN THE APPLICATION OF
TIE JUST AND REASONABLE

STANDARD

On July 28, 1976, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) established a rate level that tripled the price of "new" natural gas.

The

increase is the largest in FPC history. Its impact will be immense; the
increased cost to the consuming public over the next year could be as

great as 3.5 billion dollars.'

The new rate level was an attempt to

alleviate the present gas shortage,3 which is part of the overall energy

crisis. As such it was only one of a series of actions4 taken by the FPC
over the last five years in an effort to fulfill its duty to set just and

reasonable prices for the sale of natural gas imposed by the Natural Gas
Act.'
1. The new rate is $1.42 per mcf (thousand cubic feet) for natural gas from wells
commenced and gas dedicated to interstate commerce on or after January 1, 1975 (post
January 1, 1975 gas). Opinion 770-A, 41 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (1976). The previous
rate, established in 1974, was $.50 per mcf for post January 1, 1973 gas. 18 C.F.R.
§ 2.56a (1976).
2. The original estimate of the cost by the FPC was about $1.5 billion or an
increase of about $15.60 for the average residential consumer over the year following
the increase. [1976] EN. UsEs REP. (BNA), No. 155, at A-232. However, utility
companies have estimated that the cost will approach $4 billion or an increase of about
$40 per consumer. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1976, at 8, col. 2.
3. Beginning in 1968, the amount of natural gas distributed in the United States
has exceeded that added to reserves. [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 146, at
G-1. For data pertaining to reserves, production and future demand, see FPC, BUREAU
OF NATURAL GAS, NATURAL GAS SUPPLY AND D mAND 1971-1990 (1972).

4. See notes 90-122 infra and accompanying text.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas
company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable, and
any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared to be unlawful.
15 U.S.C. § 717c (emphasis added). Section 717d provides:
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Both the FPC and courts reviewing its actions have understood
that the duty to set just and reasonable prices entails two competing

objectives. First, the FPC is to insure a proper supply of natural gas so
that service to the customer is maintained.6 Second, it is to insure that
the price at which service is supplied is kept low to protect the consumer.7 However, the FPC and reviewing courts have disagreed concerning

which goal should predominate. As the supply of natural gas has
dwindled, the Commission's efforts to fulfill its duty have increasingly
emphasized the first objective, the improvement of supply in order to

maintain consistent service to present customers.8 Most of these actions
have been frustrated when reviewed as a result of the prevailing judicial

assumption, fixed in the early years of the Act, that the FPC's duty to
insure just and reasonable rates is primarily intended to serve the second

objective, the protection of the consumer from unreasonable prices. 9
In view of the success of previous attacks, it is likely that judicial
reaction to the present increase will be hostile. Because it far exceeds
past rate changes, the action will probably be interpreted as a de facto
deregulation of interstate natural gas prices and thus an abdication by

the FPC of its duty to maintain just and reasonable rates. 10

The

Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or
upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded,
,observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with
any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate,
charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge
classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed
and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the
Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained
in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with
the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule
filed by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease
where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise
unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates.
(emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974); FPC, STAFF REPORT
No. 2, NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1971-1990 (1972).
7. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); In re City
of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150 (1942).
8. See, e.g., Order No. 428, 45 F.P.C. 454 (1971) (small producer exemption).
9. See, e.g., Texaco v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd in part, 417
U.S. 380 (1974).
10. The new rate level bears a striking resemblance to the unregulated intrastate
market price. The new rate level, which took effect in September, 1976, is $1.42 per
mcf, while the average interstate price was $1.26 per mcf in the first half of 1975,
$1.29 per mcf in the second half of 1975, and $1.57 per mcf in the first half of 1976.
[1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 153, at G-1 to G-2; [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA),
No. 170, at G-1.
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likelihood that the rate order will be overturned underscores the need to
examine both the options open to the FPC and the judicial interpretation of the Natural Gas Act in order to find a means of breaking the

present impasse. The stakes are high; continued conflict is bound to
exacerbate the natural gas shortage and further impede the formation of

a national gas policy.1 Even though the winter of 1976-1977 brought

home the realities of the shortage to the public, 2 the emergency legislation enacted in response is only intended to solve short-term supply

problems."2

A resolution of the rate controversy is prerequisite to a

solution of the long-range problems manifested in the present crisis.
Since the ability of thO FPC to respond to present economic

conditions is limited by past judicial conceptions of what constitutes a
just and reasonable rate, it is appropriate to historically examine the

Commission's actions and judicial reaction to them to determine if the
assumptions underlying those reactions have continuing validity. In
order to make this examination, the traditional bases for regulation first
will be sketched.
I.

DEFINING THE CONFLICT: THE ECONOMIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS

Regulation of natural gas was not only a political decision to
protect the consuming public, but also a logical economic action. A
consistent supply of power at a -non-prohibitive rate is one of the
11. Martin, The Poverty of American Energy Policy, 12 TuLsA L.J. 65 (1976);
Williams, Some Ingredients of a National Oil and Gas Policy, 27 STAN. L. REV. 969
(1975).
12. While the effects of the winter of 1976-1977 cannot yet be fully assessed, it
is clear that the severe cold weather coupled with the gas shortage caused a major disaster. There were seventy-five weather-related deaths and the economies of 17 eastern
states were seriously affected because over 2 million persons were laid off work. Unfortunately the crisis will not end with winter because of the significant drain on natural
gas reserves. It is estimated that some industrial users will be without gas until the
middle of April, 1977. [1977] EN. USERs REP. (BNA), No. 181, at 4-5; [1977] EN.
UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 182, at 6-7; Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 3; Wall St.
J., Feb. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
13. Emergency National Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, [1977] EN. UsERs
REP. (BNA), No. 182, at 31-34. The legislation has two basic provisions. Section
4 gives the President power to order interstate pipelines to share gas and transport supplies to gas-poor areas of the country. This power will terminate April 30, 1977. Section 6 allows the President to authorize purchases of gas by interstate pipelines at rates
above the present level if these prices are "fair and equitable" until August 1, 1977.
The emergency legislation's approach to the supply problem appears sound, but
its effect will at best be limited. It does nothing to change the Natural Gas Act or
alter the Federal Power Commission's duty to insure just and reasonable rates. After
emergency legislation lapses, the Commission will be in exactly the same position that
it was in prior to the winter of 1976-1977.
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infrastructure services, along with transportation and communication,
which are prerequisite to a modem industrial state.' 4 To protect their
general economic welfare, all developed countries regulate their power
industries.

15

The second economic rationale for natural gas regulation is based
on the danger inherent in the gas industry's market structure. Because
all the gas used in the United States can be transported satisfactorily by
a few pipelines and there is little competitiveness at points of distribu-

tion, the natural gas industry has been characterized as either a natural
monopoly'0 or oligopoly and, as a result, a prime target for regulation.
As a natural monopoly, the bargaining position of a natural gas company in an unregulated market allows it to exploit the public through
excessive charges. However, unlike the situation in other sectors of the
economy, the welfare of the consumer is not improved if a competing
enterprise enters the market to share in the high profits enjoyed by the
original natural gas company. In this case competition is undesirable
because it effects an extreme misallocation of resources."1

14. 1 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMIcs oF REGULATION 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KAHN]; Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAG. Sci. 22, 39 (1971).
The American system of public utility regulation plays a vital role in the
national economy by making possible the dominance of private enterprise in
the operation of the industries which are of a monopoly character. Of all our
basic industries only the mails are exclusively government-owned and operated.
The railroads, the airlines, the motor transport industry, the maritime industry,
the telephone and telegraph industries, the radio and television broadcasting
systems and the electric power and natural gas industries, are all either wholly
or predominantly in private hands, despite the fact that they are the foundalion of our industrialeconomy and by their nature are not subject to the same
forces of competition as other commercial enterprises.
Address by Joseph C. Swider, former FPC Chairman, Chicago Law Club (Feb. 4, 1965)
(emphasis added), reprinted in A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PuEsr].
15.

A.

HANSON, THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

114 (International Union of Local Authorities monograph No. 89, 1966).
16. The term [natural monopoly] does not refer to the actual number of
sellers in a market but to the relationship between demand and the technology
of supply. If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at
lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural
monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it. If such a market contains more than one firm, either the firms will quickly shake down to one
through mergers or failures, or production will continue to consume more resources than necessary.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 548 (1969).
17. Since, by definition, see note 16 supra, "the entire demand within a relevant
market can be supplied at lowest cost by one firm," competition by a second firm necessarily involves expending more capital than is necessary for the needed service. The
historical solution to this problem of gaining the advantages of natural monopoly without its incumbent disadvantages has been regulation. See H. ADAMS, T-n RELATION
OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL AcrvrrY 57-133 (1887), exerpted in W. JONES, REULATED INDUSTRIES 1-5 (2d ed. 1976).
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As a result of its natural monopoly aspects and its significance for
industrial development, the natural gas industry has been classified as a
public utility.' As a public utility, some well established constitutional
principles govern how it can be regulated.

Because public utilities are

"property affected with the public interest," regulation of the rates that
they can charge does not, alone, constitute a denial of property without

due process. 19 The more significant issue of whether a rate could be set
so low as to be confiscatory was answered by the Supreme Court in
Smyth v. Ames.2 0

In Smyth stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway challenged
the Nebraska rate setting procedure for railroads, arguing that the rates

set for the company under the procedure were so low that the resulting
limitation of their profits constituted a denial of due process. The
Court, agreeing with the plaintiffs, held that an enterprise such as the
railroad is "entitled to ask a fair return upon the value of that which it
employs for the public convenience." 2 ' In effect, the Court established

the minimum threshold of a regulated rate. This minimum guarantees
a property owner the recovery of the costs of operating a regulated

enterprise, including a set profit. Thus, while property "affected with
the public interest" can be regulated, the property owner cannot be

forced to lose money on his enterprise.
18. Jurenev, Marketing of Petroleum and Natural Gas, in EcoNoMacs OF THE MIN330, 346 (E. Robie ed. 1964).
19. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). Under Munn, "property" became
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner which affected the public at large.
When one devoted his property to a use which affected the public, he was said to have,
in effect, granted the public an interest in that property, and submitted to public control
for the common good. After Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("So
far as . . .due process is concerned, . .. a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy
by legislation adapted to that purpose."), the question of when property becomes affected
with the public interest has become one of only historical interest. Cf. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("IThe notion that a business
is clothed with a public interest and has been devoted to the public use is little more
than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers.").
20. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
21. Id. at 547.
[I]n order to ascertain . .. [the fair value of the property being used by
an enterprise for the convenience of the public], the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and
market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as
may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other
matters to be regarded in estimating the value of property.
Id. at 546-47.
ERAL INDuSTRms
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In contrast to the minimum rate requirements of due process, the

Natural Gas Act, by inclusion of the just and reasonable standard, also
sets a maximum on the rates that can be charged for natural gas. Even
though the purposes such a maximum serve, insuring proper service and

protecting the consumer, are clear, how they should be translated into a
concrete standard is uncertain.

What constitutes a reasonable maximum for rates charged by a
public utility can usually be established with relative ease. In most
instances the costs of rendering service are easily ascertained and fairly

constant. From the costs of an enterprise consumer rates are computed
that give utility investors a reasonable rate of return on their investments.2 2 Rate making for the natural gas industry, however, is complicated because of its unique nature; while the industry may appropriately
be considered a public utility, it also has many of the characteristics of a
commodity market.2
Even though it may not fulfill a technical definition of a commodity, 24 gas has commodity aspects because its production responds to

market demand in much the same way as manufactured goods. Thus,
since gas is useable from the time it is piped out of the ground, its value
22. Public utility commissions evaluate two qualitative factors before making a rate
determination. The rate base, which is an amount equal to the capital investment, is
assessed first. The methods used to determine the value of rate bases have been the
subject of controversy. See notes 52-57 infra and accompanying text. A certain rate
of return, designed to make investment in that utility as desirable as investment in nonregulated enterprises having similar risks, is then multiplied by the rate base to compute
the returns to be given investors. The rates to be charged are determined by apportioning the necessary return and the operating costs of the enterprise over all the services
offered.
Electrical service is an example of a public utility which conforms easily to this
pattern. Because its fixed capital costs, resulting from the initial purchase of generating
and transmission facilities, do not fluctuate and its variable costs, such as the purchase
of primary fuels, represent a small portion of the cost of its service, the consumer rates
computed by the relevant public utility commission should insure the electrical utility
both that it can recover its costs and show a profit approximating the intended rate
of return for some time in the future. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MnARKET STRUcTuRE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 523-27 (1970).

23. A commodity market exists when six factors are present: (1) a free flow of
the commodity to market, (2) large-scale supply and demand, (3) homogeneous trading
units, (4) standardization of grades, (5) the commodity must be storable, and (6) uncertainty of supply and demand. S. ANGRIST, SENSMLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES
26 (1972). Except for the regulation of natural gas prices at the point of production,
the natural gas industry conforms to the above criteria.
24. Commodities have been defined as "tangible things capable of satisfying human
wants. The term is applied to common articles of commerce and trade. It does not
include land, natural resources, or services. The term is ordinarily used in a narrower
sense than economic goods, which includes services." B. HORTON, DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 60 (1948).
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is closely linked to the market demand for all forms of raw energy," as
well as to the costs of its production.

As a result, formulas used to

determine other public utility rates, concerned only with the problem of
allocating a service and restraining the rates charged for it, are inappropriate in the regulation of natural gas, where the duty to insure service
inherently requires the encouragement of an adequate supply of the
commodity. 26 Such a supply may not be produced if the prices paid for

natural gas are kept artificially low.
25. The United States relies primarily on four fuels: oil, natural gas, coal and
uranium.
[C]oal, oil, natural gas, and uranium are sufficiently substitutable in their
use by electric utilities to support the conclusion that they trade in the same
economic market. . . . [ihere is credible evidence that the decisions of
sellers in the natural gas producing industry, in terms of output, cannot be made
in isolation from fuel prices and output in the larger energy market.
The Natural Gas Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1973) (statement
of John N. Nassikas).
The commodity nature and substitutability of the primary fuels is shown by the
effects of regulation on the production of natural gas. The prices of uranium and coal
are not controlled. The price of oil is set under the Emergency Petroleum Act of
1973, 15 U.S.C. 751 (Supp. III). Because the control of oil prices is designed to promote energy independence, its rates have not been kept as low as those for natural
gas, which have been fixed under a traditional public utility rationale. As a result,
natural gas has been made relatively attractive and increased demand has caused its
increased production:
Uranium,
Coal
Oil
Gas
Geothermal &
Hyropower
2%
20%
43%
33%
1950
25%
8%
37%
1975
30%
DEPT. OF THE INTERiOR, ENERGY PERSPEcTIvEs 2 at 59 (1976).
26. The natural gas industry is a hybrid of a pure commodity producing industry
and a public utility. The production phase of the industry is similar to the production
of other primary fuels. See note 25 supra. The transmission and distribution phases
of the industry are natural monopolies and closely resemble other public utilities. The
rate problem arises from the fact that the two aspects cannot be treated distinctly; to
insure realistic consumer rate control all phases of the industry must be regulated. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
The FPC and the courts have approached the industry as a public utility despite
its commodity-production aspects. This approach has proven to be at odds with the
goals of natural gas regulation: fair rates and assured service. To insure service, an
adequate supply of gas must be maintained through continuous exploration and development. To promote exploration and development, an adequate rate of return must
be guaranteed the investor. Public utility rate procedures assume a constant cost which
fluctuates only slightly over the long run. See note 22 supra. Such an assumption
is justified for a natural monopoly, but not for gas exploration in which capital investment will not necessarily net any return. As a result of nonproducing or high-cost
wells, the costs of gas exploration are highly unpredictable. Because their returns on
the producing wells they do discover are limited by the inappropriate assumption of
predictable variable costs, borrowed from the regulation of other industries, gas producers are not encouraged to increase supply. Thus, the public utility approach does not
help achieve the goal of providing adequate service to the consumer. MacAvoy, The
Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAw & ECON. 167 (1971).
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Any regulation of natural gas should reflect both the commodity
and public utility aspects of the industry. Unfortunately, the judiciary
has relied on concepts of just and reasonable rates which were developed
for the regulation of industries which fit the public utility model without
tempering them with ideas based on the commodity characteristics of
natural gas. The result has been to ignore the goal of insuring adequate
service.
II.

Tim EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

The present dilemma concerning the application of the just and
reasonable standard is the result of the interaction of four
elements: (1) the availability of gas supplies adequate to meet consumer demand, (2) the scope of the FPC's jurisdiction over the natural
gas industry, (3) the formulas and approaches used by the Commission
to insure just and reasonable rates and (4) the judicial interpretation of
the statutory requirement that all rates charged for natural gas be just
and reasonable. As long as gas supplies were sufficient to meet consumer demand and the FPC's jurisdiction did not include all of the
natural gas industry, application of the just and reasonable standard
presented no problem. Because there was no shortage, rate controls
had essentially one objective, consumer protection, and the FPC and the
courts basically agreed on the means of achieving that goal. This
relationship among the four elements characterizes the formative stage
of the FPC's development. The conflict appeared in the second stage of
the Commission's development, when the FPC's and the courts' interpretation of the Natural Gas Act's duty diverged as gas supplies began
to dwindle. To understand these two distinct periods and the significance of the shift, the historical roots of the Act and the expansion of
the FPC's jurisdiction will be described.
A.

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD:

1938-1971

In 1924 the Supreme Court created the need for federal regulation
when it reviewed Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 27 to determine if a
producer state could constitutionally fix the rates on gas sold for consumption in other states. The Court held that a state could not fix such
rates, even in the absence of federal regulation, because the rates would
directly burden interstate commerce. Four years later the Court handed
27. 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
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down a similar decision dealing with the interstate transmission of
electricity.2 8
In response to these decisions, the Senate ordered the Federal
Trade Commission to investigate the industrial use of electricity and

natural gas. 29 The result was a study filling approximately 100 volumes. 30 These reports led directly to passage of the Federal Power
Act3 1 in 1935 and the Natural Gas Act in 1938. By demonstrating the

importance of the natural gas industry to the economy, the reports
provided cogent justification for the federal regulation of natural gas in
the vacuum left by the Supreme Court.2
1.

The Expansion of the FPC'sJurisdiction

The scope of the FPC's rate jurisdiction has been an exceedingly
involved question due to the complexity of the industry, which has three
distinct phases: production, transmission and distribution. There was
no debate over the total regulation of transmission companies' pipelines.3 3 Controversy centered around the significance of the Act's
34
exclusion of "production and gathering" from its scope.
While there is relatively little physical difference between producers, they were forced into four legal classifications by the FPC,
depending either on who owned them or where their gas was sold.
Integrated producers were defined as companies which were involved in
28. Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
29. S. Res. 83, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 Cong. Rec. 3054 (1928).
30. S. Doc. No. 12, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928-1936).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-828c (1970).
32. See Davis, The Influence of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigations on
Federal Regulation of Interstate Electric and Gas Utilities, 14 GEo. WASH. L. Rav.
21 (1945). See also DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power
Act of 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 30 (1945);
Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 243 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kitch]; Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Gao. LJ. 695 (1956); Note, Federal Price Control of
Natural Gas Sold to Interstate Pipelines,59 YALE L.L 1468 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
FederalPrice Control].
33. H.R. RP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
34. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas
for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial,
or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation
or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas
or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gatheringof natural gas.
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970) (emphasis added). 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1970) states:
"'Natural-gas company' means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale."
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both gas production and pipeline transmission for interstate resale.
Independent producers were those not affiliated with a particular transmission company which sold gas to pipelines that in turn resold the gas
in foreign states. Producers who sold gas directly to distributing companies and -then contracted with pipelines to transport the gas were said
to be involved in direct sales. The final category of producers were all
those operating in the intrastate market. These intrastate producers
were specifically exempted from FPC jurisdiction so that individual state
regulation would not be disturbed."
In 1940 the FPC made its first interpretation of the statutory
exemption for the production and gathering of natural gas. After
examining "(a) the language of the Act as a whole, without other
evidences of Congressional intent, (b) the report of the Congressional
committees recommending the legislation, and (c) the expressions of
individual Congressmen in the course of the debate on the bill,"' O the
Commission concluded that it was not the intent of Congress to regulate
those companies who were involved in production and gathering, when
such activities were consumated by the sale of natural gas into interstate
commerce, and held independent producers outside of its jurisdiction.87
The order subsequently led the FPC to contradictorily treat independent
producers as normal private enterprises, while classifying integrated
producers as part of a utility and thus within the FPC's jurisdiction.88
The imposition of price control on the field-market for natural gas
represented an important departure for American economic regulation;
price control over a commodity producing industry had never before
been administered by a permanent federal regulatory agency. 0 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order,40 but reserved judgment on the status of independent producers under the Act. 41 Following the apparent tenor of the Court's opinion, the FPC issued an order
35. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1970).
36. In re Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200, 203 (1940).
37. Id. at 208.
38. In re Interstate Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 416 (1943). This controversy grew
out of Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 50
(preliminary injunction denied), 34 F. Supp. 980 (1940), in which the corporation successfully resisted state ordered regulation because over 99% of its sales were interstate.
39. See Kitch, supranote 32, at 243.
40. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.s. 682 (1947).
41. Id. at 690 n.18. 'The Federal Power Commission has not asserted jurisdiction
over all sales taking place in the natural gas fields even though [such sales are] in
interstate commerce [because the gas involved is purchased] for resale for ultimate public consumption. . . . We express no opinion as to the validity of the jurisdictional
tests employed by the Commission in these cases." Id.
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announcing that it would not regulate sales of independent producers
unless Congress mandated the action.42
The FPC maintained this position four years later when it exempted Phillips Petroleum Company from its jurisdiction.4 3 To the surprise
of the FPC, the Supreme Court overturned the Phillips ruling and held
the jurisdictional distinction between independent and integrated producers invalid.4 4 The Court reasoned that since "protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies was the
primary aim of the Natural Gas Act," 45' the distinction had no basis in
the statute. Both the independent and integrated producer were within
the purview of the Act because both had an impact on the price paid for
natural gas by the consumer.
The final category of producers to be brought under the FPC's
jurisdiction were those participating in direct sales. These producers,
although not subject to FPC rate control,4 had to apply for the certificate of public convenience and necessity required to transmit any gas in
the interstate pipeline system. t These certificates enabled producers to
sell gas directly to end users and allowed the transmission companies to
perform the delivery function at a set charge.
In 1959 the FPC first denied a direct sales application.48 The
decision was based on two grounds. First, the price set between the
producer and the end user would exert an upward pressure on rates in
other interstate contracts. Secondly, the purchasing company's end use
was deemed inferior. In sustaining this action,4 9 the Supreme Court, in
effect, approved indirect rate regulation over direct sales, even though
this type of regulation was unauthorized by the Act. With the decision,
the FPC's control over prices for all natural gas moving in interstate
commerce was complete.
2.

The Evolution of the Just and Reasonable Standard

When the FPC began regulating natural gas pipelines it had to
choose between two approaches. It could adopt a common carrier type
42. Order No. 139 (1947), reprinted in Federal Price Control, supra note 32, at
1482 n.86. The Commission put its opinion into effect; see In re Fin-Ker Oil and
Gas Prod. Co., 6 F.P.C. 92 (1947).
43. In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
44. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
45. Id. at 685.
46. See 15 U.S.C. 717b (1970).
47. 15 U.S.C. 717f (1970).
48. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 21 F.P.C. 138 (1959).
49. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
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of regulation and set rates that applied to the whole industry,"° or a

public utility approach and treat each company as a separate unit."'
While the FPC opted for the public utility approach used by the states in

the regulation of natural gas prices, its rate making methods were innovative.
At the FPC's inception, the states regulated the sale of natural gas
under the Smyth v. Ames "fair value" test and fixed prices in order to

give utilities a certain rate of return based on the "reproduction or
trended costs" of capital investment. 52 In 1942 the FPC dramatically
changed public utility regulation by allowing only "actual legitimate
costs"53 to be used as the basis for the rate of return. This departure
from traditional rate procedures, which became known as the "prudent
investment approach," 54 was approved in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas.",
Writing for the majority in Hope, Justice Douglas noted that Con-

gress had not provided a formula defining just and reasonable rates. In
the absence of a specific standard, he reasoned that the "end result" of

protecting the consumer, rather than a fixed formula, should control.5"
In light of this definition of just and reasonable, Justice Douglas deter-

mined that the FPC's new approach did not create returns so small as to
be unconstitutionally confiscatory or violative of the Natural Gas Act.
The prudent investment approach, which in effect defined a new
minimum threshold for investor's returns in public utility regulation,
established two significant trends. First, the move was clearly consumer
50. An example of common carrier regulation is the Interstate Commerce Commission which sets rate schedules that apply uniformly to all firms hauling goods. See
49 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
51. Because the goal of rate regulation under such an approach is the limitation
of the regulated industry's profits, see note 17 supra and accompanying text, public
utility commissions assume that each regulated enterprise has unique costs and determines its consumer rates individually.
52. Reproduction costs are the value of the assets of the regulated enterprise at
the time of the rate determination. Thus, they are calculated by determining what
the replacement of the capital investment would cost in the present market. See Smythe
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1897).
53. Actual legitimate costs include only the original cost of the capital investment
less depreciation in the rate base. Reproduction costs are rejected because they are
too conjectural. See In re City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150,
167 (1942).
54. Bonbright, Contributions of the Federal Power Commission to the Establishment of the Prudent Investment Doctrine of Rate-making, 14 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 136
(1945); Hale, Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM.
L. REv.488 (1944); PRmIST, supra note 14, at 494.
55. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
56. Id. at 603. 'The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important." Id. at 602.
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oriented.57 Secondly, as in state natural gas regulation, the individual
firm's profit margin was the focus of rate making.58

This second

characteristic quickly became a required aspect of FPC rate making.
For example, in response to the prudent investment approach, the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held: "The rate of return not only
may be, but in a utility case must be, the largely determinative factor of
reasonableness. .

.

. The value of the service to users is neither a

reasonable rule nor supported by judicial decisions."59
The first problems with the Commission's rate making procedure
occurred simultaneously with the expansion of its jurisdiction.

One

problem presented by the regulation of integrated producers was complex; while they consumated sales in interstate commerce, these compa-

nies also had shares in certain intrastate markets. The FPC therefore
was forced to make an arbitrary allocation of costs to companies be-

tween the regulated interstate sales and unregulated intrastate sales.60
A second problem was created when all independent producers

were brought within the FPC's rate making jurisdiction by the Phillips
decision and required to meet the just and reasonable standard. Up to
this time, the FPC had been operating on an individual company basis,

like any other public utility commission. After the inclusion of independent producers in the FPC's jurisdiction, the Commission was del-

uged with applications for rate determinations and the approach took on
new significance. The size and complexity of the task literally overwhelmed the FPC's administrative process; some 2,900 applications for

individual rate determinations were received between 1954 and 1962.61
Processing the application of the Phillips company alone took 82 hear-

ing days, filled 10,626 pages with testimony and involved 235 exhibits. 62
57. The use of actual legitimate costs as opposed to reproduction costs diminished
the rate base of operating companies. Because the rate of return for gas producers
was fixed, the use of actual legitimate costs reduced the price of natural gas to the
consumer.
58. Even so, the adoption of a uniform price system was not foreclosed by the
Court in Hope. See Justice Jackson's dissent, 320 U.S. at 652-53. The dissent is enlightening both for its prophetic quality and perceptive analysis. Jackson predicted the
future problem in rate making, making the commodity versus service distinction. Justice
Jackson argued that emphasis should shift from the producer to the product, clearly
articulating the future dilemma: 'The unfortunate effect of judicial intervention in this
field is to divert the attention of those engaged in the process from what is economically wise to what is legally permissible." Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
59. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 121 F.2d 159, 164 (1941).
60. In re Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 4 F.P.C. 340 (1945).
61. C. HAwKiNs, THE FIELD PRIcE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 37 (1969).
62. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural
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The administrative delay between the time of application and the
rate hearing, required by the duty to insure just and reasonable standards, had the effect of freezing natural gas prices. 6 The business
exigences of the interstate gas market, however, required a more immediate response. Tho FPC's solution was a compromise procedure,
permitting gas sales to be made under temporary certificates of convenience and necessity subject to approval at a subsequent rate hearing.64
These certificates were issued merely on a prima facie showing by the
seller that the rates satisfied the just and reasonable standard under the
traditional public utility approach.
Less than two years after Phillips,the rate making process began to
reflect economic, as well as administrative, shortcomings. The problem
was strikingly illustrated when four corporations applied for permanent
certificates of convenience for the sale of offshore Louisiana gas to a
pipeline servicing a New York utility without attempting to justify the
price under the reasonable rate of return formula.r, Because the price
was the highest the transmission company had ever paid, the FPC twice
determined there was insufficient evidence to grant permanent certificates. 66 When the corporations threatened to withhold the gas from
interstate commerce unless the certificates were issued, the FPC relented. 67 The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision, because
the certification of the sale at the increased rate violated the Natural
Gas Act, 68 and the Supreme Court affirmed under slightly different
69
theory.
Taking judicial notice of the delays incumbent in full rate determinations, the Court heldj that the jusl and reasonable standard was
applicable to rate, but not certification, proceedings. Thus the FPC
was told that rate hearings were necessary prerequisites to rate changes.
The Court based its insistence on a full rate determination in part on the
assumption that producers had no other market in which to sell their
Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 941, 954 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Breyer & MacAvoy]. By 1960 the Commission had completed only ten of the thousands of applications they had received. Id.
63. Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings:
CATCO in Context, 62 COLuM. L. Rnv. 773, 795-807 (1962).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
65. Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563 (1957).
66. 17 F.P.C. at 574, reheard, 17 F.P.C. 732 (1957).
67. Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880 (1957).
68. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958).
69. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391, 394 (1959) (generally referred to as CATCO).
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gas, since 90% of all gas was moving in the interstate market. 70 This
state of affairs would change radically in the coming years as the

intrastate market continued to grow.7 1 As a result of the decision, the
FPC was faced with the dilemma of holding the line on prices through

temporary public convenience and necessity certificates or conducting
full-fledged rate determinations. The first option had considerable
economic drawbacks and the latter was proving administratively impossible.
At the same time, the FPC was coming under fire for its overall

performance from Congress. In 1960 the Landis Commission concluded "the Federal Power Commission without question represents the
outstanding example in the federal government of the breakdown of the

administrative process.

72

In an attempt to extricate itself from the

dilemma, the FPC fashioned a new type of producer regulation.

The Commission directly repudiated its former rate making procedure in 1960. In a decision again involving the Phillips Petroleum
Company,73 the FPC found that the traditional original cost "prudent
investment" rate base was an unworkable method for setting rates
because producers of gas "cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
properly classified as traditional public utilities."7 4 The decision signaled a change in focus from an analysis of each producer's costs to an

industry-wide approach for determining the value of gas. 5 The new
approach to rate making was to divide the country into five areas7 8 and
70.
71.
72.
CoMsM.

Id. at 394.
See note 108 infra.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE

ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 54 (Comm. Print 1960).
73. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
74. Id. at 542. In support of this conclusion the Commission relied on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Sunray Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 159 (1960):
A pipeline performs a service akin to those traditionally performed by public
utilities. The independent producer, on the other hand, is unique among the
objects of public-utility regulation because it is not engaged in rendering a service to the public in the conventional sense of that concept, but rather simply
in selling a commodity which it owns.
Id. at 160.
75. 24 F.P.C. at 546. The Commission noted that this change was partially due
to the administrative burden of the former procedure: "[11f our present staff were immediately tripled, and if all new employees would be as competent as those we now
have, we would not reach a current status in our independent producer rate work until
2043 A.D. .... "
76. The five areas were (1) the Permian Basin (Texas and part of New Mexico);
(2) southern Louisiana (including the offshore area in the Gulf of Mexico); (3) Hugaton-Anadarko (part of Oklahoma and Kansas); (4) Texas Gulf Coast; and (5) Southwest (Mississippi, Arkansas, and parts of Alabama, Texas and Oklahoma).
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determine the rate on the basis of area data.r? The Supreme Court
concurred with the FPC's switch in tactics, stating that it shared "the
Commission's hopes that the area approach may prove to be the ultimate
solution.

78

A second innovation which followed the FPC's rejection of public
utility concepts was the adoption of two price ceilings, one for "new"

natural gas and a lower ceiling for "old" gas."

The theory behind the

two-tier system was that lower prices for old gas would deprive pro-

ducers of unjust rents, benefiting consumers, and that higher prices for
new gas would encourage enough additional gas production to meet
future consumer demands. 80 The Commission issued its first full rate
determination using the two-tier approach in 1965.81

The Supreme

Court sustained the rate order, noting that as long as the Commission
rate was in a "zone of reasonableness" ' the approach was appropriate.
Finding the FPC's past approaches shortsighted, the court expressed

hope that two prices "may be used so as both to provide an incentive for
exploration and to restrict to reasonable levels producers' profits." 8
Area rates and the two-tier price levels were both attempts to
resolve the legal dilemma. Area rates gave a better reflection of the
economic needs of the producer industry than the former individual cost

analysis. The two-tier price system was theoretically intended to guard
the public interest through assurance of just and reasonable rates. The
FPC was attempting to balance the consumer and investor interests.

The FPC's problems, however, were soon complicated; "[qiuietly,
almost unnoticed, sometime in the middle Sixties, the United States
77. Interim rates were established along the guidelines of previous contracts. FPC,
No. 61-1, STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLicY, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960). For further analysis
of FPC area rate action, see Searls, Decision of Federal Power Commission in Phillips
Petroleum Company Case and Effect on Producersof Commission's Statement of General Policy No. 61-1 as amended, 12 OIL & GAS INsT. 1, (Matthew Bender 1961); Landis,
Theoretical and PracticalConsiderationswith Reference to Price Regulation in Production and Transmission of Natural Gas, 13 OIL & GAS INST. 401 (Matthew Bender
1962).
78. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 (1962).
79. Opinion No. 468, 34 F.P.C. 159, 185-88 (1965). See generally Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 62, at 959.
80. 34 F.P.C. at 186.
81. Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965). See generally
Mosburg, The Permian Decision-A Study in Group Regulation, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 133
(1966); Note, New Approaches By the FPC to the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers: an Evaluation, 17 VAN. L. REv. 1200 (1964).
82. Permain Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 797 (1968), citing FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942),

$3. 390 U.S. at 799,
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became a have not energy nation."'

4

Against this background, the fact

that low gas prices were not bringing forth adequate reserves to meet the

market demand became increasingly evident. In December, 1968,
spokesmen for transmission and distribution companies joined in asking
for higher gas prices to stimulate exploration. 5 The producers were
accused of crying "wolf" at the prospects of a gas shortage and former
Lee C. White, even characterized the prospects as a
FPC chairman,
"myth".8 The FPC staff, however, recognized the impending shortage
in a 1969 report noting the downward trend of the gas reserves to the
gas production ratio.8 7
As the shortage increased in magnitude, area rates with the two-tier
price levels became economically obsolete. With the focus on maintaining just and reasonable prices, the FPC had created a flourishing,
unregulated intrastate market and an industry with no incentive to
expand. 8 8 It had achieved its goal of protecting the consumer's purse,8 9
but only at the expense of other consumers' ability to acquire gas for

new needs.
B.
THE

FPC

THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION

1971-1976:

AND THE COURTS STRUGGLE WITH THE SHORTAGE

The first indication of the FPC's official recognition of the natural
gas shortage was its requirement that all interstate pipelines report
84. Gooch, Current Developments in FPCand Natural Gas Matters, 23 OIL & GAS
INST. 99 (Matthew Bender 1972).
85. FPC, 1975 REPoRT, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, Vol. 1, at 102.
86. Heady, Gas Producer Regulation in a New Environment, 24 OIL & GAS INST.
1, 3 (1973).
87. FPC, A STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND (1969).

Nine-

teen sixty-eight was the first year that production and consumption of natural gas exceeded the amount added to reserves through exploration and recalculation of present
gas fields. In simple terms, it signaled that unless the ratio changed toward more reserves the U.S. would run out of gas.
88. For the natural gas industry to expand or even keep pace with demand, additional reserves must be found. However, the exploration and producing segments of
the industry contracted between 1954-1971. The contraction was drastic-in 1954 there
were 2,687 active drilling rigs and by March, 1971 only 828. Geophysical activity,
always a prelude to exploratory drillings, shrank from a post-war peak in 1953 of 8,673
to a low of 2,521 by 1970. Exploratory wells dwindled from a 1956 peak of 16,207
to a low of 7,539 by 1970. Hearings on Consumer Energy Act of 1974 Before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 321 (1973).
89. The regulation of prices at the gas wellhead by the Federal Power Commission (the FPC) has been a measure of "welfare" policy since its inception by
Supreme Court decree in 1954. As with local rent controls, or maximum
charges for medical services paid for by the state, gas price restrictions were put
into effect to "keep prices down for the consumer."
MacAvoy, Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAw & ECON. 167, 167
(1971) (footnote omitted).
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whether their supplies would be adequate to assure deliveries to custom-

ers; if a pipeline anticipated a shortage, it was required to file a
curtailment plan.90

Shortly thereafter, the FPC began to change its

policies regarding the supply of natural gas. Recognizing that it was

entering a new period, 91 it attempted to rebalance the interests of the

consumer and the investor, in light of the shortage, consistent with the
just and reasonable standard. The result was an effort to increase the
supply of natural gas to meet the present demand of customers.

Even

though this trend was clearly in the consumer's best interests, twentythree years of regulatory precedent restricted the alternatives available to

the FPC. An examination of several of the Commission's actions and
the judicial response to them serves to highlight the present legal dilem-

ma; as the FPC has moved to increase the supply of natural gas to meet
consumer needs, it has consistently encountered resistance paradoxically based on the just and reasonable standard designed to protect the

consumer's interest.
The small producer exemption was one of the FPC attempts to
increase the supply of natural gas. Under the exemption small pro90. Order No. 431, 49 F.P.C. 85, reprinted in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 406 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1972).
The curtailment plans have been a major part of the FPC policies to reduce the
effects of the natural gas shortage. There are two distinct problems in a shortage situation: one is excessive demand, the other inadequate supply, Curtailment plans are
an attempt by the FPC to deal with excessive demand through allocation. While curtailments are a major controversy in the field of natural gas regulations, the area will
not be covered in this paper. The just and reasonable standard is almost entirely used
to evaluate the FPC's efforts to increase supply which is the focus of this paper. However, a recent case involving both curtailments and the just and reasonable standard
was Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 532 F.2d 412 (5th
Cir. 1976). In that case, the circuit court ruled that the FPC had the authority to
order compensation between curtailed and non-curtailed customers. This compensation
plan evidently does not violate the just and reasonable standard because it is a surcharge
rather than a rate. For further analysis of curtailments see Tiano, The Limits of Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Curtailments, 64 GEo. L.J. 27 (1975); Comment, FPC
Natural Gas Allocation: Curtailment in Context, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1370 (1972).
91. The emergence of a naturalgas shortage during the past two years marks
a historic turning point-the end of natural gas industry growth uninhibited
by supply considerations. Not only has the Nation's proven gas reserve inventory for the lower 48 states been shrinking for the past three years, but major
pipeline companies and distributors in most parts of the country have been
forced to refuse requests for additional gas service from large industrial customers and from many new customers. For practical short-term purposes we
are confronted with the fact that current proven reserves in the lower 48 states,
as reported by the American Gas Association, have dropped from 289.3 trillion
cubic feet in 1967 to 259.6 in 1970, a 10.3 percent drop within a three-year
period. Furthermore, approximately 95 percent of this proven reserve inventory is already committed to gas sales contracts and is therefore unavailable
for sales to new customers or for increased volumes to old customers.
FPC, STAFF REPORT No. 2, NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1971-1990, at ix
(1972) (emphasis added).
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ducers were, in effect, deregulated. 2 Soon after the order went into
effect it was challenged as violative of the just and reasonable standard.
As a result, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC9 3 overruled the Commission. Although the circuit
court took judicial notice of the two factors on which the FPC based its
decision, that "a critical gas shortage faces the nation" and that "small
gas producers have historically accounted for as much as 80% of new
exploration," 94 its conclusion reflected past case law. The court found
that "whatever the wisdom of the policy [of increasing supply to meet
consumer needs] at this critical juncture of our national energy source
problems, [it could not] hold that non-regulation [was] the statutory
equivalent of regulation."9 Thus, the FPC was held to a duty to insure
that all rates were just and reasonable, which it had violated by the nonregulation of small producers.
The Supreme Court took a different tack on review.9 6 The Court
reasoned that small producer deregulation in itself did not violate the
Natural Gas Act because the exemption insulated the public from
unreasonable rates, 97 and because small producers were still subject to
indirect regulation through the Act's certification procedures.9 8 However, the Court remanded the order for a clear definition of the just and
reasonable standard to be applied in certification proceedings. The
Court's decision also stressed that "the prevailing price in the marketplace cannot be the final measure of 'just and reasonable' rates." 99 Even
though the Court left the door open for the use of market prices as one
of the factors to be considered in rate making, 10 0 it still insisted that the
92. Order No. 428, 45 F.P.C. 454 (1971).

The order applied to producers with

annual natural gas sales not exceeding 10,000,000 mcf.

93. 474 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94. Id. at 418.
95. Id. at 423. The argument that "the Commission would no longer be regulating
rates, the market mechanism itself would, in effect, dictate small producer prices which
were 'just and reasonable"' was also rejected. 474 F.2d at 422.
96. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
97. The small producer exemption included a refund section for unreasonably high
rates. 45 F.P.C. 457 (1971). This refund was to be made by the pipeline company
to the consumer and the small producer would incur no liability. Since the consumers'
interests were protected, the purpose of the Act was fulfilled. See 417 U.S. at 392.
98. Small producers could now be put in the same class as producers making direct
sales. The Commission still had to approve certificates of convenience and necessity
before the gas could go into the system. The Commission could deny an application
if the contract price was too high. See notes 48 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
99. 417 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
100. 417 U.S. at 399, citing Southern La. Rate Area Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 441 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
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older definition of just and reasonable be substantially complied with in
setting rates.
A second illustration of the present impasse was provided by
judicial reaction to an FPC procedure termed Optional Certification, 1 '
under which an individual producer could sell gas at a price above the
area '10
ceiling. The procedure was initiated as a "safety valve mechanism 2 to enable pipelines to procure more supplies. In its
first
application, the FPC fixed a price that was 70% greater than the established area rate. 10
Even though the validity of the order depended on a judicial
redefining of the just and reasonable standard, the Supreme Court had
earlier indicated that it was prepared to do so. In Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FPC04 the Court apparently endorsed the use of non-cost factors to
protect the public's interests, both "existing and foreseeable,"'0 5 holding
that consideration of such factors in rate making did not, of itself,
violate the just and reasonable standard. In effect, the Court seemed to
recognize the existence of a new maximum threshold for the "zone of
reasonableness" unrelated to the return to the investor and entirely
concerned with procuring supplies for the consumer.
Despite Mobil Oil, the FPC's first Optional Certification order was
overturned on review. 10 Expressing doubt concerning the relevance of
Mobil Oil, 107 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found the use of noncost factors inappropriate in setting rates for natural gas already committed to the interstate market. The use of non-cost factors is a subtle
niethod of recognizing the significance of the intrastate market, which
101.
upheld
(1976).
102.
1975).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Order No. 455, 48 F.P.C. 218 (1972). The theory behind the procedure was
in Moss v. FPC, 502 F.2d 461 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.Ct. 1003
Moody, 1974-The Gathering Storm, 26 OIL & GAS INST. 1, 4 (Matthew Bender
[hereinafter cited as Moody].
Belco Petroleum Corp., 49 F.P.C. 1154 (1973).
417 U.S. 283 (1974).
Id. at 309.
Consumers Union v. FPC, 510 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 660.
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absorbs almost all newly discovered reserves."' 8

Unfortunately, the

availability of such supplies has been blocked by an out-moded definition of just and reasonable.
The FPC is simultaneously using several other approaches. Since
1970, the Commission has permitted short-term emergency sales to be
1
made at rates indirectly regulated through certification procedures. 01
These certificates are valid for 60 days and can only be granted if the

pipeline is unable to meet firm commitments to its customers.

In an

effort to enable the regulated pipelines to compete in the intrastate
market, the FPC has extended the validity of these certificates to 180
0
days."
Even though the question had been rendered moot by the FPC's
subsequent reversion to the former 60-day plan,"' the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals granted review of the 180-day procedure." 2 The
court found the 180-day emergency policy was equal to deregulation
and an avoidance of the FPC's responsibility to maintain the just and
LOWER 48 STATE
NET RESERVE ADDITIONS
INTERSTATE VS. INTRASTATE
Inferred
Net Interstate
Intrastate
Reserve
Total Net
Reserve
Additions
AGA Reserve
Additions (1)
(Form 15)
Additions
Percent
Tcf
Percent
Tcf
Tcf
Year
47
9.4
53
10.7
20.1
1964
37
7.9
63
13.3
21.2
1965
27
5.1
73
14.1
19.2
1966
30
6.3
70
14.8
21.1
1967
21
2.5
79
9.5
12.0
1968
28
2.3
72
6.0
8.3
1969
99
11.0
1
0.1
11.1
1970
80
7.5
20
1.9
9.4
1971
100
9.6
0
(0.2)
9.4
1972
82
5.3
18
1.2
6.5
1973
(1) Derived by assuming that intrastate reserve additions are equal to the difference
between total AGA reserve additions and the reserve additions committed to the
interstate market.
Moody, supra note 102, chart 47.
109. Order No. 418, 44 F.P.C. 1574 (1970). See generally Moody, supra note 102,
at 27.
110. Order No. 491, 50 F.P.C. 742 (1973), as amended by Order No. 491-a, 50
F.P.C. 848 (1973), Order No. 491-b, 50 F.P.C. 1463 (1973) and Order No. 491-c,
50 F.P.C. 1634 (1973).
111. FPC Order No. 491-d. In June, 1974, even these 60 day sales were repudiated
in FPC Opinion No. 699. This lasted until September, 1974 when FPC Opinion No.
699-b was issued. Both limited term and 60 day emergency sales were again authorized
under sharply restricted circumstances. See Moody, supra note 102, at 27.
112. Consumer Fed'n v. FPC, 515 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906
(1975).
108.
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reasonable standard. 113 The court also showed hostility toward the
FPC by placing the decision in a historical context:
Throughout the years in controversies such as Phillips and
CATCO, the FPC has sought to justify inaction at the level

of producer rates on the ground that the pressures built up
by producer rate increases could somehow be contained at the
pipeline level by invoking a regulatory agency's authority to

disallow excessive costs. And throughout the 114
years, the Court
has found this professed substitute inadequate.

This reaffirmation of the responsibility to maintain the just and reasonable standard left the FPC with few options to increase supply.

One method being pursued to lure supplies from the intrastate
market to interstate customers has been the encouragement of direct
sales. Contrary to the logic used by the Supreme Court to justify the

indirect regulation of direct sales," x5 the FPC is now urging interstate
customers to purchase gas directly from producers."

6

The Commission

has reasoned that since direct sales are not subject to FPC rate jurisdiction, interstate customers can purchase gas at any rate acceptable to the

producer.": 7 Even so, the method appears vulnerable to attack. While
the applicability of the just and reasonable standard to direct sales has
not been litigated, it is likely that the standard would be held to limit the
certification of direct sales." 8
The most dramatic attempt to encourage the increase of natural gas

supplies came in 1974 when the FPC discarded the area rate making
113. The court stated: "As a reviewing Court, we must grant the Commission broad
latitude in devising methods of regulation 'in this time of acute energy shortage.' But,
although we are receptive to 'novel' approaches, we cannot neglect our duty to 'assure
fidelity to the functions assigned to the regulatory agencies by Congress."
515 F.2d
at 360 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 357-58.
115. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
116. Order No. 533, [1975] 6 FED. PoWER SERV. at 5-803.
117. Direct sales are
a way for high priority industrial and commercial customers to obtain supplies
of natural gas and thus prevent, or at least mitigate, the threatened adverse
consequences of deepening levels of pipeline curtailments. . . . Because such
direct sales would not be subject to our rate jurisdiction, high priority customers could compete with the producer's intrastate customers for gas supplies
not otherwise available to the interstate market.
Id.
118. Under the logic of FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974), the just and
reasonable standard should be applicable to direct sales. Whether the direct sales policy
violates the standard is another question. Certainly this policy could not meet the standard certified in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974), because the direct sale
policy does not encourage new supplies to be dedicated to the interstate market. In
fact, the Commission is supplying an incentive, higher prices to producers, for new
supplies to be kept in the intrastate market,
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procedure and adopted a uniform national rate base. 119 Surprisingly,
the Commission's action was sustained by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Shell Oil Co. v. FPC (the National Rate Case)120 as

a proper exercise of rate making authority. According to the court, it
gave "heightened deference to the Commission's expertise" because of

the innovative nature of the new approach. This result was influenced
by two factors.

First, the FPC couched its rate making procedure in

public utility terms.' 2 ' More significantly, those attacking the rate
urged an alternative more radical than that adopted by the FPC, arguing
that the FPC should acknowledge the commodity value of natural gas

and let its prices rise to the market level. Thus the opinion was more a
refutation of the petitioners' argument than a validation of the FPC's
action.

1 22

In validating the order, the court articulated the tests which a just
and reasonable rate must satisfy: "the long-standing 'total effect' test
of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas. . .and. . . a 'zone of reasonableness' to
compensate for the necessarily imprecise nature of cost determinations
and the inherent difficulty of the regulatory undertaking."'-2 3 As these
tests suggest, the National Rate Case can be characterized as a cautious
move by both the FPC and the court. The FPC had been careful to
base the rate on established cost factor estimates. Even though validating the FPC's approach, the court significantly assumed that the just

and reasonable standard was incompatible with a rate based on commodity market value.
119. Opinion No. 699, [1974] 1 FED. POWER SERv. at 5-307. Opinion No. 699
set a maximum rate of 42 cents per mef on all gas produced after January 1, 1973
and all new gas dedicated to the interstate market. Existing contracts were not changed.
120. Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976).
121. In fact, the FPC did not use non-cost factors to reach the price.
The overall cost determination was based on an evaluation of the following
components: (1) Successful Well Cost, (2) Dry Hole Cost, (3) Lease Acquisition Cost, (4) Cost of Other Production Facilities, (5) Other Exploration
Cost, (6) Exploration Overhead, (7) Production Operating Expense, (8) Net
Liquid Credit (subtracted from costs), (9) Royalty Expense, (10) Recompletion and Deeper Drilling Cost (stipulated), (11) Regulatory Expense (stipulated), (12) Return on Production Investment, and (13) Return on Working
Capital.
Id.at 1067.
122. See id. at 1084:
To accept this free market "commodity value" would be to eschew the congressionally mandated responsibility of rate regulation which is devised to
reach a "just and reasonable" rate. Fixing a "just and reasonable" rate for a
product sold in any inherently uncompetitive market requires more than mere
subservience to national and internationalmarket forces.
(emphasis added).
123. Id. at 1071 (citation omitted), quoting Placid Oil Co. v. FPC,483 F.2d 880,
889 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
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The rejection of the commodity value standard in the National

Rate Case will be felt by the FPC in its latest effort to increase supply.
In Opinion No. 770, which increased the uniform national rate by 270%,
the FPC adopted the position advocated by the petitioners in the National Rate Case, and included non-cost factors in the rate determination

process. 124 While other traditional cost factors were cited, the unmistakable goal of the opinion is the dedication of new reserves to the
interstate market by making the price of interstate gas competitive with
intrastate gas and other forms of energy. 12 5 With the adoption of

Opinion No. 770, the full gambit of rate regulation has been run; the
FPC's rate making procedure has shifted from an individual determination, focusing on the profits of producers, to an industry-wide approach
intended to increase the supply of natural gas.

Consistent with public reaction to Opinion 770,120 the courts will
probably not maintain the deferential attitude exhibited in the National

Rate Case. Application of the just and reasonable standard in past
decisions would seem to force reviewing courts to overturn the increase.
Despite the Commission's lip service to past formulations, the FPC's
departure from them is clear. Non-cost factors are to be considered
along with the traditional cost analysis factors, and are not to be
determinative.'

27

Although supported by past judicial applications of the just and
reasonable standard, the impact of a decision overturning Opinion 770

would be adverse to the present and future needs of consumers.

By

maintaining low prices, it is inevitable that the interstate market of gas
124. Opinion No. 770, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,364 (1976).
125. See id. at 33,390, (exhibit 27) noting recent average prices for intrastate natural
gas (1st Half, 1975-125.9; 2d Half, 1975-128.9; 1st Quarter, 1976-154.8). The
FPC also noted that the fuel oil equivalent for natural gas was selling at between 1.281.57 mcf equivalent. The Federal Energy Administration's $11.40 per barrel upper tier
price was equal to 1.67 per mcf at 85% BTU parity value. See id. at 33,391.
126. Rep. John E. Moss (D. Calif.) threatened to impeach the three Commissioners
(Chairman Dutham, James Watt, and John Holloman, III) who voted for the increase,
[1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 161, at A-6. On October 2, 1976, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations stated:
[The FPC] takes cellar position because of its overt disregard of its congressional mandate. Specifically, it has refused to maintain a program of "just
and reasonable" natural gas prices consistent with its governing statutes and
applicable court decisions. It has acted without sound evidence. It has not
enforced the delivery of natural gas supplies to consumers. The Federal Power
Commission has displayed a conscious indifference to the public beyond comparison with any other regulatory agency. The Subcommittee believes that this
agency is in line for a major overhaul by the Congress.
FosTER NATuRAL GAS REP., Oct. 7, 1976, at 9 (emphasis added).
12,7. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974); text accompanying note
104 supra,
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will continue to contract, limiting gas supplies in nonproducing areas,
while unregulated intrastate markets grow. Therefore, an adverse decision would hurt the very consumers that the Natural Gas Act was passed
to protect. A low price is an admirable objective only it there is gas
available; the consumer is not benefited by a low price if there is no gas
to be supplied.

III.

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

Several approaches could be taken to resolve the legal problems
incumbent in the application of the just and reasonable standard. Most
methods would solve the problem by cutting the Gordian knot, doing
away with producer rate regulation or judicial review of such regulation. Because these solutions leave the judiciary with no role in the
rate making process, they involve consequences undesirable in light
of the legislative intent behind the Natural Gas Act. The standard
that must be considered when evaluating the following proposals is
whether the economic results engendered by the solution would be in
the consumer's interests, as well as whether the legal conflict between
the FPC and the courts would be solved.

A.

JUDICIAL CONTRACTION OF THE

FPC's JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court can alter its past role by reversing the 1954
Phillips case and holding that regulation of producers by the FPC is
no longer required by the National Gas Act. This action would end
the legal conflict between the FPC and the courts, because the Commission would no longer have any power over the production segment
of the industry.
Judicial contraction of the FPC's jurisdiction would deny the
assumption underlying the Phillips case that the Natural Gas Act was
passed primarily for the protection of the consumer. The impact of
producer sales on consumer prices is the same today as it was in 1954.
The fact that the present form of regulation might not be in the public
interest does not necessarily mean that nonregulation would be in
the best interest of the consumer. Changing the goals of natural gas
regulation should be the function of the legislature. 12 8
Exclusion of natural gas producers from FPC jurisdiction ignores
the consequences this action may entail. There is a real possibility
128. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 400-01 (1974).
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that in the future the consumer could be held hostage by an unregulated
gas industry. Also, the economics of a depleting resource cannot be
ignored. The supply of natural gas is finite and continued production
will inevitably exhaust present reserves.' 2 9 When the supply becomes
inelastic, no matter how high it is priced there will be no additional
supply.'3 0 If the natural gas industry is not subject to regulation when
the point of inelastic supply is reached, the consumer will literally be
at the mercy of the producers.

Court ordered deregulation would also have an adverse effect on
interstate relations. If the federal government withdraws from the field
of regulation, producer states, no longer restrained by the preemption

doctrine, will be free to pass legislation adverse to the interests of
consumers in nonproducing states. Even though some of this legislation is likely to be held violative of the commerce clause, significant

harm may result before a definitive ruling on these statutes is issued.' 8
129. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628, 629 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting):
The heart of this problem is the elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable
nature of natural gas itself. Given sufficient money, we can produce any desired amount of railroad, bus, or steamship transportation, or communications
facilities, or capacity for generation of electric energy, or for the manufacture
of gas of a kind. In the service of such utilities one customer has little concern with the amount taken by another, one's waste will not deprive another,
a volume of service can be created equal to demand, and today's demands will
not exhaust or lessen capacity to serve tomorrow. But the wealth of Midas
and wit of man cannot produce or reproduce a natural gas field.
130. This situation has already occurred in the early part of this century. The Appalachian natural gas region, which included West Virginia, western Pennsylvania and
southern Ohio, was highly productive from 1882-1917. After its reserves peaked, the
price of gas in the area doubled but the supply of gas steadily decreased. Kitch, supra
note 32, at 248-49.
131. While producer states cannot unilaterally withhold gas from interstate commerce, see Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1924), they could take other
constitutional measures that would adversely affect consumer states. The Supreme
Court has held that state legislation that sets a minimum price for natural gas sold
in the producing state does not violate the commerce clause, even though it affects
interstate rates, if its purpose is to curb the waste of natural resources, protect the owners of mineral rights, or shield the state's economy. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless
Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S.
190 (1950). Even though such rate regulation was subsequently held invalid in light
of the expansion of the Natural Gas Act's scope to include independent producers, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955) (per curiam), it is clear
that its invalidity was based on the preemption doctrine, rather than the commerce
clause. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963)
("mhe federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of
the prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas . . . or for state regulation which
would indirectly achieve the same result."). Thus if the Natural Gas Act rate regulation were suspended, Cities Service would again be valid. See generally Dutton, The
Supreme Court's Natural Gas Act:Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Completes
Judicial Legislation, 1 TuLsA L.J. 31 (1964); Meyers, Federal Preemption and State
Conservation in Northern Natural Gas, 77 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1964).
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B.

JUDICIAL ABDICATION OF THE DUTY TO REVIEW

A similar alternative is for the Supreme Court to subtly abandon
the just and reasonable standard by acceding to the FPC's expertise in
rate making, thereby rubber stamping any rate determination even
though it is based on fictional cost analysis. This approach invests
the FPC with the sole responsibility for determining just and reasonable
rates. The legal conflict is resolved, but a host of other problems takes
its place.
First, as noted by Justice Jackson in Hope, if the Court were to
"hold that a given rate is reasonable just because the Commission has
said it was reasonable, review becomes a costly, time consuming pageant
of no practical value to anyone.' 3 2 Besides making a mockery of the
concept of judicial review, the door is left open for a future Commission
to become entirely business oriented. 33 Given free rein by a deferential
judiciary, the FPC can ignore those consumer interests which were the
primary reason for its creation. Even though a business oriented Commission can be controlled by the threat of congressional impeachment,
the need to define the just and reasonable standard is still present.
C.

CONGRESSIONAL DEREGULATION

Deregulation can be accomplished if Congress specifically exempts
producers from rate regulation. This alternative has almost become a
reality on several occasions. 34 While Congressional deregulation
would eliminate the conflict over what is a just and reasonable rate, this
solution has major drawbacks.
Besides creating the problems previously discussed in regard to
judicial contraction of the FPC's jurisdiction, Congress would also
discourage the development of an energy program using all primary
fuels and abandon all questions of supply to the free market. This
effect would be unfortunate, as the answers dictated by the market place
132. 320 U.S. at 645.
133. The captured regulatory agency theory is explored in Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MANG. Sci. 1 (1971).
134. In 1950, Congress exempted independent producers, S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 96 CoNG. REc. 4365 (1950), but President Truman vetoed it, H.R. Doc. No.
555, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). In 1955, Congress again exempted independent
producers, H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) and President Eisenhower vetoed
the legislation because it was procured by improper lobbying techniques, Kitch, supra
note 32, at 256. In 1976, by a four vote margin, the House rejected deregulation
through an amendment to H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). [1976) EN. UsERs
REP. (BNA), No. 131, at A-8.
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many times fail to take into account non-economic goals. For example,
allocation by the market place ignores the fact that natural gas is a
clean-burning, environmentally desirable fuel. 13 5 Because the environmental value of natural gas is greater to a region with severe air
pollution than to an area without it, the free market allocation in such
instances fails to find the most efficient use for available gas. Along the
same lines, the need for gas in -the long run may outweigh its present
value. A free market can cause early consumption of this valuable
resource that is needed for future generations. By deregulating natural
gas prices Congress would strip the FPC of a needed tool in the
establishment of an overall energy policy for the benefit of consumers.
D.

ADAPTING THE JUST AND REASONABLE

STANDARD

TO MEET CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

The present rate controversy presents a unique opportunity to
reinterpret the just and reasonable standard. The interaction of the
courts and the Commission has created a body of common law that has
come to be equated with the just and reasonable standard. This body of
common law is now forcing a rigid approach to rate setting that was
never contemplated by the drafters of the Natural Gas Act. Under this
rigid approach, the Commission is now diverted by the procedural
questions of rate determination, rather than concentrating on the overall
effect of proposed rate increases. The Hope decision clearly found
there was no specific formula identified with the duty to insure just and
reasonable rates. Justice Douglas interpreted this lack of specificity as
an indication of an intention to give the FPC the administrative flexibility to attain the end result of consumer protection.
There are no constitutional or statutory barriers that preclude the
further evolution of the standard to reflect the Natural Gas Act's twin
goals of providing fair consumer rates and adequate service. The FPC's
135. See [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 155, at A-i1, A-12:
Three California state authorities are urging the Federal Power Commission to adopt a new policy that would allow Southern California counties to
directly purchase intrastate natural gas for boiler fuel during severe pollution
emergencies. While the California agencies are only seeking permission for two
parts of the state if adopted, the proposed policy statement could possibly apply nation-wide.
The petitioners noted the Order 533 was adopted to relieve economic
crises for curtailed customers, and claimed that a similar policy for alleviating
environmental crises also is needed. "The economic costs of such environmental crisis in terms of ill health, lost work hours, and production should be
considered by this commission in its policy determination."
(emphasis in original).
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original adoption of the traditional public utility approach of regulation
is not controlling today. While consumer protection may have been
adequately achieved through strict control of the natural gas industry's
profits in the past, changed circumstances now dictate a different approach to insure a continued adequate supply of natural gas. 1 6 To this
end, reviewing courts must realize that the just and reasonable standard
has never been a fixed principle of law, and acknowledge that the public
interest would best be served by pursuing the end result of encouraging
the maximum amount of return over the longest period of time.
This end result orientation would allow the FPC to change its focus
from controlling the costs and profits of the natural gas industry to
meeting present and future consumer supply problems. This would
solve the present legal conflict by making what is economically wise also
legally permissible. With greater administrative flexibility, the FPC
would no longer be forced to fulfill the requirements of the now largely
irrelevant public utility model and could deal with the natural gas crisis
directly through rate determinations.
An end result approach would avoid the problems inherent in other
possible resolutions of the conflict over application of the just and
reasonable standard. First, it permits an effective recognition of the
commodity characteristics of the natural gas industry, emphasizing supply considerations so that proper service to appropriate consumers 1 37 is
insured. At the same time, continued regulation recognizes the importance of energy and permits the injection of non-economic values into
energy control and allocation. Under an end result orientation, residential and commercial consumers would not be forced into a wildly
fluctuating commodity market, where they would have little bargaining
power, and made to bear the burden of excessive prices that are not
related to the policy of increasing supply. Thus, the FPC could face the
future of regulating a depleting resource with the power to both maintain supply and equitably distribute natural gas.
136. The amount of profit made by natural gas producers could be controlled through
taxes. Taxes would be apportioned on a company by company level in order to account
for the variance between the size and the profits of the different corporations. Such
a scheme of taxation would be more equitable than the uniform national rate, presently
used for the same purpose, which is based on an average cost analysis.
137. The determination of who is an appropriate consumer is a major controversy
in itsrlf. The fact that there is but a limited supply of natural gas will force the decision to be made. Whether it is to be supplied to the highest bidder, the most productive
sectors of the economy or the consumers with the greatest need, the FPC, either through
acquiescence or direct control, will make an allocation decision. See note 90 supra.
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CONCLUSION

By giving the FPC the ability to better control supply and allowing
it to directly confront allocation problems, a redefined just and reasonable standard would supply the Commission with a valuable additional
method with which to execute a national energy policy. Using the
reformed standard, factors of regional demand and environmental necessity, as well as -the existence of alternate energy sources, could be
considered in rate making. While a new just and reasonable standard
would not provide a complete solution to either the natural gas shortage
or the energy crisis, it is a step in the right direction.

Jay Allen Chaffee
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